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RECKONING WITH RAPANOS:
REVISITING "WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES"
AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL WETLAND REGULATION

Jonathan H. Adler*
Rapanos v. United States' is the latest episode in the serial effort to
identify the precise meaning of "waters of the United States."2 Federal
courts have struggled to define the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") since the law was adopted. Rapanos
notwithstanding, these efforts are likely to continue for years to come. The
court's splintered holding, and competing visions of the federal
government's proper role in environmental protection, will preserve the
definition of "waters" as contested terrain.
Although no single opinion in Rapanos commanded a majority of
the Court, the Court delivered a discernible holding. Specifically, the
Court held that CWA jurisdiction over private lands is limited. This is the
second time in six years that the Court has so held. The Court rejected the
expansive interpretation adopted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Environmental Protection Agency, and most lower courts, 4 and reaffirmed
that federal regulatory authority only extends to those wetlands that have a
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. Portions of this article are based upon
testimony delivered to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water,
August 1, 2006. Thanks to Jonathan Entin for comments on a draft of this article.
1 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
2 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
3 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding "waters of the United States" does not extend to isolated
waters and wetlands).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. (Gerke 1), 412 F. 3d 804 (7th Cir.
2005) (interpreting SWANCC narrowly); Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391
F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003)
(same); United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); United
States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); compare In re Needham, 354 F.3d
340 (5th Cir. 2003) (after SWANCC federal jurisdiction only extends to wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001)
(same).
*
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"significant nexus" to navigable waters of the United States. Nonetheless,
the full implications of Rapanos will not be clear for years to come.
This article offers a preliminary assessment of the Rapanos
decision and its implications for water pollution control and wetlands
conservation. Part I of this article briefly surveys the history of litigation
over the meaning of "waters of the United States" since the enactment of
the CWA in 1972. While federal courts were initially quite sympathetic to
expansive interpretations of federal regulatory authority, the Supreme
Court has begun to accept meaningful limits on CWA jurisdiction. Part II
describes the split decision in Rapanos. While there is a clear holding in
Rapanos, the lack of a majority opinion will ensure continued litigation
and uncertainty over the precise scope of federal regulatory authority
under the CWA. Part III assesses how Rapanos has been applied by lower
courts to date, finding that it has not taken long for different courts to
apply the opinion in different ways. Part IV looks to the future, and
discusses the opinion's potential implications for environmental protection
and wetland conservation efforts by both the federal government and nonfederal actors.

I.

THE ROAD TO RAPANOS

Enacted in 1972, the Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of
pollution into "navigable waters," which are defined, in turn, as "waters of
the United States." 5 It prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant" - defined
to include dredged material, rock, sand, and solid or industrial waste - into
navigable waters without a federal permit.6 Section 404 authorizes the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, subject to oversight from the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to issue permits "for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites."7 Other provisions authorize the issuance of permits of
other activities.8
'33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
U.S.C. § 13 11(a).
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (c). Additionally, the Corps must give the Fish and Wildlife

633

Service and National Marine Fisheries Service the opportunity to comment on permit
applications. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c) (2005).
8
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (providing for permits for the discharge of pollutants).
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The Army Corps did not originally interpret "waters of the United
States" to encompass wetlands and other areas that would not, in
themselves, commonly be referred to as "waters." 9 The EPA and
environmentalist groups, on the other hand, believed that regulating
wetlands was necessary to achieve the CWA's stated goal "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."' 0 In 1974, the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC")
sued the Corps arguing that "waters of the United States" encompassed all
waters, including wetlands, irrespective of whether they were truly
navigable." In 1975, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia agreed, holding that the CWA extended "federal jurisdiction
over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution," including wetlands.1 2 The Corps
acquiesced to this interpretation and declined to appeal. 13
Federal regulations subsequently promulgated by the Army Corps
and the EPA defined "waters of the United States" to include 1) all waters
used for interstate commerce;14 2) all interstate waters and wetlands;15 3)
all tributaries or impoundments of such waters;16 and, most significantly:
[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction
of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters: (i) [w]hich are or could be used
9 See 39 Fed. Reg. 12,119, codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974) (adopting
traditional definition of "navigable waters" as interstate and navigable-in-fact waters). As
former Army Corps official Bernard Goode commented, "If Congress meant in 1972 for
section 404 to protect wetlands, it kept that secret to itself." Bernard N. Goode, The
GeographicExpansion ofSection 404, SB99 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 29, 31 (1997).
1o 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a).
"1See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
12Id. at 686.
13 From a public choice perspective, that a federal agency would accept a court decision
expanding the scope of its authority should not be at all surprising.
14 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2005).
" Id. § 328.3(a)(2).
"Id. § 328.3(a)(4), (5).
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by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other
purposes; or (ii) [f]rom which fish or shellfish are or could
be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or (iii)
[w]hich are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce.' 7
This definition explicitly included "wetlands adjacent to waters (other than
waters that are themselves wetlands)."' These regulations greatly
expanded the federal government's regulatory authority over private land
use. 19 By some estimates, the Corps and the EPA asserted regulatory
jurisdiction over "270 to 300 million acres of swampy lands in the United
States." 20
The Supreme Court first considered the scope of the Corps'
regulatory authority in 1985 in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc.2 1 In Riverside, the Court unanimously concluded that the Corps could
reasonably define "waters of the United States" to include "wetlands
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries." 22 The Court
based this holding on the Corps' conclusion that such wetlands "are
inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the United States."2 3 In so
holding, the Court did not "express any opinion" on whether federal
regulatory jurisdiction could be further extended to cover "wetlands that
are not adjacent to bodies of open water."24 Following Riverside Bayview
the Corps published an interpretation of its authority, commonly referred
17

Id. § 328.3(a)(3).
"Id. § 328.3(a)(7).
'9 The adoption of a new wetland delineation manual in 1989 would further expand the
scope of federal wetlands regulation. See Warren Brookes, The Strange Case of the
Glancing Geese, FORBES, Sept. 2, 1991, at 104 (reporting that the 1989 FederalManual
for Identifying and DelineatingJurisdictionalWetlands "extended the reach of the 1972
Clean Water Act"). See also JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MAIATERS 134 (1997) (noting
changes in federal definition of what constitutes a "wetland").
20 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct., 2208, 2215 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
plurality).
21 474 U.S. 121 (1985).

.

22

Id. at 123.

Id. at 134. See also SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) ("It was the significant nexus
between wetlands and 'navigable waters' that informed our reading of the [Act] in
Riverside Bayview Homes.").
24
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.
23
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to as the "migratory bird rule," 25 stating that the Corps' regulatory
authority extends to intrastate waters:
a) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected
by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines; or
c) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered
species; or
d) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.26
The Corps thereby effectively asserted its regulatory authority over all
territory meeting the definition of waters or wetlands throughout the
United States.
The Corps' expansive interpretation of its own regulatory authority
did not go unchallenged. Numerous suits were brought challenging its
interpretation of "waters," the "migratory bird rule," and even the
constitutional authority for regulation of wetlands and isolated waters.27
By and large these challenges failed,2 8 even after the Supreme Court
exhibited a renewed willingness to consider federalism limitations on the
scope of federal regulatory authority. 29

25 The "migratory bird rule" should more properly have been referred to as the "migratory

bird interpretation," as the Army Corps issued the interpretation without engaging in
public notice and comment as required by section 553 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 n.1.
26 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323).
27 See, e.g., Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1993); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th
Cir. 1995).
28 But see United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
29 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Gun Free School Zones
Act exceeds the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding portions of the Violence Against Women Act
exceed the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause). But see Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the prohibition of medical marijuana possession
under the Controlled Substances Act as a permissible exercise of federal power under the
Commerce Clause).
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In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. US. Army
Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), 30 a regional waste management agency
challenged the assertion of federal jurisdiction over permanent and
seasonal ponds that had formed in abandoned gravel pits. Because the
waters in question were isolated, and neither adjacent to nor
hydrologically connected to navigable waters, SWANCC contended that
the land in question lay beyond the reach of federal regulation.3 1 The
petitioners pressed their case on both constitutional and statutory
grounds. 32 The Court only reached the latter, citing federalism concernsspecifically the concern that a broad interpretation of the CWA would
"push the limit of congressional authority" under the Commerce
Clause 33 -to hold that the Act did not reach isolated, intrastate waters. 34
The Court refused to adopt a more expansive interpretation of the Act
absent a "clear indication that Congress intended that result."35 By
resolving the issue on statutory grounds, the Court avoided the need to
address the extent to which Congress could regulate the use of isolated
waters were it to adopt legislation explicitly for that purpose. 3 6
SWANCC reaffirmed, but refused to extend, the holding of
Riverside Bayview Homes. Specifically, in SWANCC the Court held that
the CWA does not confer federal regulatory jurisdiction over isolated,
intrastate waters.37 Rather, the CWA only reaches those waters or
wetlands that have a "significant nexus" to navigable waters.38
30
31

531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Id at 165-66.

32 id
3

34

Id. at 173.
1d. at 171.

Id. at 172. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that the Corps of Engineers'
regulation was due deference under Chevron USA v. NRDC. Id. Although courts will
generally defer to federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language, the
SWANCC majority found such deference to be inappropriate "where the administrative
interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon
a traditional state power." Id. at 173.
36 The dissent, on the other hand, did address the Commerce Clause issue and found the
regulations in question to lie well within the outer limits of federal Commerce Clause
authority. Id. at 181-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3

" Id. at 171.
38
1d. at 167.
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Consequently many prairie potholes and other isolated wetlands and
waters were removed from the federal government's regulatory
jurisdiction. While the Court's holding applied to all "waters" under the
CWA, many commentators believed the opinion would have its greatest
impact on wetlands conservation - as the regulation of wetlands,
particularly those not adjacent to navigable waters, represents the farthest
extension of CWA jurisdiction. 39
Federal regulations define wetlands as "areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.,"o Yet
it is not a given parcel's wetland characteristics, but its connection to
waters of the United States that forms the basis for federal jurisdiction. As
already noted, the CWA, by its terms, only extends to "waters of the
United States." The CWA extends federal jurisdiction beyond those waters
traditionally used for navigation, but federal regulatory jurisdiction was
still limited.4 1
Application of SWANCC by lower federal courts as well as by
regional Corps' offices was quite inconsistent.4 2 Several circuits, including
39 See Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act after SWANCC:

Using a Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30
L.Q. 811, 884 (2003) (noting that SWANCC requires a "significant nexus," and
therefore not just "any" hydrological connection will suffice to establish federal
jurisdiction under the CWA); Lance D. Wood, Don't Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction
Extends to All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the TraditionalNavigable Waters and to
Their Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,187, 10,189, 10,195 (2004) (noting
"potentially disastrous" and "catastrophic" effects of some potential. interpretations of
SWANCC).
40 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2005).
41 As the Supreme Court explained in SWANCC, "Congress intended the phrase
'navigable waters' to include 'at least some waters that would not be deemed "navigable"
under the classical understanding of that term."' SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001).
Nonetheless, there is no "basis for reading the term 'navigable waters' out of the statute .
... The term 'navigable' has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that
were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made." Id. at 171172.
42 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of Engineers Needs
to EvaluateIts District Office Practicesin DeterminingJurisdiction,(2004).
ECOLOGY.
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the Fourth, 43 Sixth,44 and Seventh, 45 read SWANCC narrowly - as urged
by the EPA and Army Corps 46 - so as only to preclude federal regulation
of isolated, intrastate, non-navigable waters. The Fifth Circuit, on the other
hand, has read SWANCC more broadly to exclude waters that are neither
navigable themselves nor adjacent to navigable waters, including
wetlands, "puddles, sewers, roadside ditches and the like," if such waters
are not "truly adjacent to navigable waters."A7
The federal government briefly considered revising its wetland
regulations to account for the SWANCC decision. In January 2003, the
Army Corps and the EPA issued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking to clarify the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the
CWA.4 8 In December 2003, however, the Army Corps and the EPA
announced they would not engage in a new rulemaking. As a result,
variable interpretations and applications continued, creating substantial
uncertainty as to the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction under the
CWA. 49 Despite the existence of nationally applicable regulations, similar
See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003).
"4See United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003).
45 See United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003).
46 See Memorandum by Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, U.S. EPA & Robert M.
Andersen, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Supreme Court Ruling
Concerning CWA Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.saj.usace.army.mil/permit/documents/swancc.pdf; see also Wood, supra note
43

39.
See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration
Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001). Although Needham and Rice specifically address the
scope of federal regulation over "waters of the United States" under the Oil Pollution
Act, both decisions note that federal jurisdiction under the OPA was intended to be
coextensive with that under the Clean Water Act. Needham, 354 F.3d at 344; Rice, 250
F.3d at 267.
48 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
49 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 39, at 10,189 (noting SWANCC was "ambiguous" and
courts have been "inconsistent" in their interpretations); Amended Statement of Patrick
Parenteau, Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, before the House of Representatives
Committee
on
Government
Reform
(Sept.
19,
2002),
available at
http://aswm.org/fwp/swancc/pp0209l9test.htm ("The decision has created substantial
uncertainty regarding the geographic jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act."); Association
of State Wetland Managers & Association of State Floodplain Managers, Position Paper
on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Determinations Pursuant to the Supreme Court's Jan. 9,
47
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ecological conditions could produce different jurisdictional results in
different parts of the country. This lack of uniformity, and the resulting
circuit split, eventually led the Supreme Court to revisit the definition of
"waters of the United States" in Rapanos.
II. RAPANOS AND CARABELL
Rapanos v. United States actually consisted of two cases out of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that were consolidated by the
Court: United States v. Rapanos50 and Carabell v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers.5 1 In both cases, the petitioning landowners argued
that their lands should not be subject to federal regulatory jurisdiction
under the CWA. As applied to their lands, they argued, federal wetland
regulations exceeded the scope of the CWA, and may even surpass the
constitutional limits of the Commerce Clause.
The Carabells challenged an Army Corps decision denying them a
permit to fill a small wetland on their property in Macomb County,
Michigan.5 2 The Army Corps asserted jurisdiction over their property
because it abuts a ditch that connects to a drain that empties into a creek
which eventually connects to Lake St. Clair.53 The Carabells' wetlands are
hydrologically distinct from the ditch due to a man-made beam along the
54
edge of the land, but the parcel is nonetheless "adjacent" to the ditch.
According to the Army Corps, the close proximity of a ditch that
eventually feeds into navigable waters is enough to make the Carabells'
land part of the "waters of the United States."55
2001 Decision, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Dec. 2001 ("The section 404 regulatory program has been in turmoil ever
available at
,
decision.")
SWANCC
Court's
Supreme
the
since
http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancc/position.pdf.
so 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
s 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004).
52 Id. at 705-06.
s3 Id. at 706.
54

1d. at

708.

" Id. at 708-09.
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John Rapanos may be a less sympathetic litigant,5 6 but the
assertion of federal regulatory jurisdiction over his land was more
ambitious than in the Carabell case. The wetlands at issue in Rapanos
were over ten miles from the nearest navigable waterway.5 7 Nonetheless,
the federal government maintained the lands were subject to federal
regulation because water from the wetlands drained into a "man-made
drain" that, in turn, drained into a creek that flowed into a navigable
river. According to the federal government, this hydrological connection
made the drain a "tributary" of navigable water so it could prosecute Mr.
Rapanos for altering his land without a federal permit.59
The Court failed to produce a majority opinion in Rapanos.
Instead, the Court splintered 4-1-4.60 Five justices supported the judgment,
vacating and remanding, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's
decisions upholding the Army Corps' assertion of regulatory jurisdiction,
but could not reach full agreement on the rationale.
Four justices joined a plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia
reading the CWA quite narrowly.61 According to the plurality, federal
jurisdiction over "waters of the United States" could only extend to "those
wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters
of the United States' in their own right, so that there is no clear
demarcation between 'waters' and wetlands, are 'adjacent to' such waters
and covered by the Act." 62 Four justices joined a dissent that called for
near-absolute deference to the Army Corps' construction of its own
It is undisputed that John Rapanos and his agents knowingly deposited fill material
onto the relevant parcels without seeking to obtain a federal permit despite being
informed of the existence of wetlands. Further, "Rapanos allegedly threatened to
'destroy"' an environmental consultant who concluded one of the parcels contained 48 to
58 acres of wetlands, and violated both state and federal cease-and-desist orders. Rapanos
v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2238-39 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
s7 Id. at 2214 (Scalia, J., plurality).
ss Id at 2219.
s9 Id. Rapanos himself faced a sentence potentially exceeding five years in prison and
hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines. Id. at 2215.
6 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas
and Alito. Id. at 2214. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id.
at 2236. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 2252.
61 Id. at 2215 (Scalia, J. plurality).
62
Id. at 2226.
56
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jurisdiction under the CWA. The justice in the middle, Justice Kennedy,
rejected the expansive interpretation of federal jurisdiction adopted by the
federal government and endorsed by the Sixth Circuit, but also embraced a
broader (and more ambiguous) interpretation of the CWA than that urged
by the plurality.6 According to Justice Kennedy, neither the plurality nor
the dissent adopted the jurisdictional test suggested by prior Supreme
Court precedents. 65
The lack of a majority opinion in Rapanos necessarily creates
some uncertainty and ambiguity, but it does not deny the existence of a
holding that is binding on lower courts and federal regulators. As
explained in Marks v. United States,66 "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."' 67 As the judgment of the Court was to vacate and remand the
Sixth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Rapanos68 and Carabell v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,69 the concurring opinion of Justice
Kennedy, and the grounds of agreement between Justice Kennedy and the
plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia, form the holding of the Court.
Under Rapanos, "the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands depends
upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question
and navigable waters in a traditional sense." 70 As defined by Justice
Kennedy, "to constitute "'navigable waters"' under the Act, a water or
wetland must possess a 'significant nexus' to waters that are or were
navigable in fact, or that could reasonably be so made." 7 In this regard,
the Rapanos court largely followed the reasoning adopted by the Court in
63 Id. at

2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
SId. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65 Id. ("In the instant cases neither the plurality opinion nor the dissent by Justice Stevens
chooses to apply" the applicable test).
66 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
67
Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 152, 169 n.15 (1976)).
6' 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
69 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004).
70 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208, 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 2241 ("Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.").
71
d. at 2236.
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SWANCC that "waters of the United States" only applies to those waters
and wetlands that have a "significant nexus" to navigable waters.
Whereas the Sixth Circuit and federal regulators had maintained
that any hydrological connection between a given wetland and navigable
waters would be sufficient to assert federal regulatory jurisdiction, a
majority of the Court rejected this view. A "mere hydrologic connection,"
by itself, is not enough to establish jurisdiction in all cases. 72 The
connection must be "significant." 73 Justice Kennedy elaborated on what
such a connection must entail:
wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within
the statutory phrase "navigable waters," if the wetlands,
either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands
in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as "navigable." When, in contrast,
wetlands' effects on water quality are speculative or
insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed
by the term "navigable waters." 74
Whereas it is reasonable for the Corps to presume jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to truly navigable waters - that is "waters that are or
were navigable in fact, or that could reasonably be so made" 75 - adjacency
to a nonnavigable tributary will not, absent a greater ecological
connection, establish jurisdiction. 76
Justice Kennedy also joined the plurality and rejected the dissent's
willingness to defer to any conceivable regulatory interpretation of
"waters of the United States," no matter how broad.7 7 As Kennedy noted,
"the dissent would permit federal regulation whenever wetlands lie
alongside a ditch or drain, however remote and insubstantial, that
eventually may flow into traditional navigable waters. The deference owed
72

Id at 2251.

See id. at 2236, 2241, 2248 (noting need for "significant" nexus).
Id at 2248 (emphasis added).
1Id. at 2236.
76
1d at 2252.
77Id at 2247.
7

74
7
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to the Corps' interpretation of the statute does not extend so far."78 Justice
Kennedy observed that "the dissent reads a central requirement out namely, the requirement that the word 'navigable' in 'navigable waters' be
given some importance." 79 As Justice Kennedy and the plurality both
made clear, "the word 'navigable' in the Act must be given some effect."80
The urgency or importance of some environmental concerns
provides no justification for adopting a more expansive view of federal
regulatory jurisdiction or adopting a more lenient approach to statutory
interpretation. According to a majority of the Court, such policy
considerations cannot trump the text of the statute itself. As Justice
Kennedy noted, in explicit agreement with the plurality, "environmental
concerns provide no reason to disregard limits in the statutory text."" This
view contrasts with the dissent's concern that limiting federal regulatory
authority would portend environmental ruin.82
As in the SWANCC decision, a majority of the Court adopted a
narrow construction of the meaning of "waters of the United States" so as
to ensure that the Clean Water Act did not exceed the scope of the
Commerce Clause. As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence "[iln
SWANCC, by interpreting the Act to require a significant nexus with
navigable waters, the Court avoided applications - those involving waters
without a significant nexus - that appeared likely, as a category, to raise
constitutional difficulties and federalism concerns."83 Justice Kennedy's
Rapanos opinion did not reject this approach. To the contrary, he
explained that this aspect of the SWANCC precedent limited the scope of
federal jurisdiction sufficiently to prevent any jurisdictional problems.
Wrote Kennedy, "as exemplified by SWANCC, the significant-nexus test
itself prevents problematic applications of the statute." 84 This does not
constitute a rejection of commerce clause arguments. To the contrary,

78

Id. (emphasis added).

79 id.

80

Id

81 id

Id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("By curtailing the Corps' jurisdiction of more than
30 years, the plurality needlessly jeopardizes the quality of our waters.").
83
Id. at 2246 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 2250.
82
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commerce clause concerns lie behind the interpretation adopted by the
Court in Rapanosjust as they did in SWANCC.
While there is some amount of agreement between Justice
Kennedy's concurrence and the dissenting justices, it would be wrong to
view any part of Justice Stevens' dissent as a "holding" of the Court.
Nothing in the dissent constitutes a portion of the judgment of the Court,
so nothing in the dissent is part of the actual holding of the case. As the
Supreme Court noted in Marks, the holding of the Court is "that position
taken by those Members who concurredin the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."8 5 Moreover, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion explicitly
rejected Justice Stevens' near-limitless approach to federal jurisdiction, so
the latter provides no useful guide for determining the CWA's
jurisdictional limits. One can speculate how the justices would line up in
hypothetical future cases, and it is quite certain that the dissenting justices
would uphold virtually any basis for jurisdiction accepted by a fifth
justice, but that is distinct from suggesting that any part of the dissent
constitutes a portion of the holding binding on federal agencies or lower
courts.
III. RAPANOS INTHE LOWER COURTS
Rapanos did not halt existing litigation over the scope of federal
regulatory jurisdiction, nor did it ensure a uniform understanding of the
CWA's reach. Within months of the decision, after only a handful of
lower courts were called upon to apply the Rapanos holding, divergent
interpretations emerged.
The first case in which a federal appellate court applied Rapanos
86
was Northern CaliforniaRiver Watch v. Healdsburg.
In Healdsburg,the
Ninth Circuit upheld the Army Corps' assertion of regulatory jurisdiction
over "Basalt Pond," a rock quarry alongside the Russian River in
California. This outcome was not a surprise, as the pond was directly

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 152,
169 n.15) (1976)) (emphasis added).
8 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir.
2006).
85
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adjacent to an indisputably navigable waterway. Nonetheless, the ruling
rested on a misreading of Rapanos.
While the Ninth Circuit sought to follow Justice Kennedy's
opinion in upholding federal jurisdiction over the Basalt Pond it read his
opinion too narrowly. The Basalt Pond is adjacent to a navigable water,
the Russian River.8 8 Rather than base its conclusion on this fact, the court
further explicated the ecological connections between the two waters,
noting that "the district court made substantial findings of fact .. . that the
adjacent wetland of Basalt Pond has a significant nexus to the Russian
River" due to various physical, hydrological, and ecological connections. 89
This additional analysis was required, according to the Ninth
Circuit, because "the mere adjacency of Basalt Pond and its wetlands to
the Russian River is not sufficient for CWA protection." 90 Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Rapanos may not be a paragon of clarity,
but it says the opposite. Justice Kennedy's opinion explains that the
federal government can presume that wetlands adjacent to actual
navigable waters have a "significant nexus" to such waters, and that
additional evidence of an ecological connection is unnecessary for CWA
jurisdiction. Specifically, "[a]s applied to wetlands adjacent to navigablein-fact waters, the Corps' conclusive standard for jurisdiction rests upon a
reasonable inference of ecologic interconnection, and the assertion of
jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the Act by showing
adjacency alone." 9 1 This, Justice Kennedy noted, was "the holding of
Riverside Bayview," and he took pains to stress that he sought to base the
Court's holding on its prior precedents in Riverside Bayview and
SWANCC. Only where wetlands are adjacent to non-navigable waters, as
was the case for the wetlands at issue in the Carabell case, is additional
evidence required. 92 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reached the proper outcome in
Healdsburg, but adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of Rapanos in
the process.
" Id. at 1026.
88
Id.
9
Id. at 1031.
90 Id. at

1030 (emphasis added).

9' Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 2252 (noting mere adjacency to a tributary is not sufficient to establish
jurisdiction).

15

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. 1
Healdsburgis not the only interesting post-Rapanos decision. 93 On
June 28, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
held, in United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.,94 that Chevron Pipe Line
was not liable for the discharge of oil into a nearby creek and stream bed
that lacked a "significant nexus" to navigable waters of the United
States. 95 While acknowledging that Rapanos should control the outcome
of the case, due to the ambiguities of Justice Kennedy's controlling
opinion, the district court largely relied on pre-Rapanos decisions within
the Fifth Circuit for its holding:
Because Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the
"significant nexus" required, this Court will look to the
prior reasoning of this circuit. The Fifth Circuit . . . has

interpreted "the waters of the United States" narrowly ....
Without any clear direction on determining a significant
nexus, this Court will . . . "feel its way on a cases-by-case
basis." Thus, as a matter of law in this circuit, the
connection of generally dry channels and creek beds will
not suffice to create a "significant nexus" to a navigable
water simply because one feeds into the next during the
rare times of actual flow.

. .

. [A]bsent actual evidence that

the site of the farthest traverse of the spill is navigable-infact or adjacent to an open body of navigable water, the
Court finds that a "si nificant nexus" is not present under
the law of this circuit.
As in Healdsberg, the specific result was defensible under Rapanos,
though the reasoning was questionable. The district court did not misread
Justice Kennedy's opinion so much as it failed to apply the decision due to
its lack of clarity. Rather than rely upon pre-Rapanoscase law in isolation,
the district court could have sought to harmonize those cases with
Rapanos. This would not necessarily have altered the result, as the
See, e.g., U.S. v. Evans, 2006 WL 2221629 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
Id. at 615.
96 Id. at 613, 615 (citations omitted).
9

94 437
95

16

RECKONING WITH RAPANOS
connection between the creek beds in question and any navigable-in-fact
waters may have been too ephemeral and attenuated to satisfy the
"significant nexus" requirement. Such an outcome, however, would have
been more faithful to the lower court's obligation to follow the Rapanos
holding.
Not all lower courts have had as much trouble applying the
Rapanos holding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for
example, appears to have adopted a proper reading of the decision in
United States v. Gerke Excavating.97 Gerke Excavating had been fined for
discharging pollutants into "waters of the United States" without a Clean
Water Act permit. 98 Gerke's specific offense consisted of depositing fill
material, in this case dredged stumps, roots, and sand, onto privately
owned wetlands on a parcel near Tomah, Wisconsin, that it sought to
develop. 99 The wetlands in question, as described by the court, drain into
"a ditch that runs into a nonnavigable creek that runs into the
nonnavigable Lemonweir River, which in turn runs into the Wisconsin
River, which is navigable." 00
Gerke could not claim that the federal government sought to apply
a novel interpretation of the CWA and applicable federal regulations.
Instead, it argued that federal regulation of the land in question exceeded
the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause. 01 Relying upon
Gonzales v. Raich, 0 2 Judge Richard Posner easily rejected Gerke's claims
in an opinion for a unanimous panel of the court.' 0 3 The Supreme Court
accepted Gerke's petition for certiorari, however, and then remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of Rapanos.10

United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. (Gerke 11), 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
98 Gerke 1, 412 F.3d 804, 805 (7th Cir. 2005).
97

99Id
101Id.

at 806.

102545

U.S. 1 (2005).
412 F.3d at 805.

103 Gerke I,

'04 126 S.Ct. 2964 (2006) (vacating judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light
of Rapanos).
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On remand, the Seventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion,
explicated its understanding of the Court's holding in Rapanos. '0s Like
the Ninth Circuit in Healdsburg, the Seventh Circuit relied upon Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh
correctly characterized Kennedy's opinion:
The test he proposed is that "wetlands possess the requisite
nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase 'navigable
waters,' if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.'
When, in contrast, wetlands' effects on water quality are
speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly
06
encompassed by the statutory term 'navigable waters."'
Applying this test, the panel held, would require additional fact-finding, so
it further remanded the case back to the district court.' 07
Interestingly enough, the Gerke panel also picked up on the
suggestion made in Justice Stevens' Rapanos dissent that insofar as there
are any waters or wetlands that would meet the jurisdictional test put
forward by the plurality, but not that of Justice Kennedy, jurisdiction
could be asserted nonetheless. 0 8 Specifically, the panel observed, "[t]he
plurality's insistence that the issue of federal authority be governed by
strict rules will on occasion align the Justices in the plurality with the
105 Gerke II, 464 F.3d 723, 723-35 (7th Cir. 2006). This opinion was also likely written
by Judge Posner, as it was published in a font typically used by Posner but not by other
members
of
the
court.
See
How
Appealing,
http://howappealing.law.com/092206.html#018005 (Sept. 22, 2006, 14:38 EST).
106 Gerke II, 464 F.3d at 724 (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2248
(2006)).

'os Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I assume that Justice
Kennedy's approach will be controlling in most cases because it treats more of the
Nation's waters as within the Corps' jurisdiction, but in the unlikely event that the
plurality's test is met but Justice Kennedy's is not, courts should also uphold the Corps'
jurisdiction. In sum, in these and future cases the United States may elect to prove
jurisdiction under either test.").
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Rapanos dissenters when the balancing approach of Justice Kennedy
favors the landowner."l09 The court further noted that this would be a
"rare case," and not in need of further explication in the instant case.' 10
There are reasons to suspect this analysis may be overly solicitous
of federal jurisdiction. While Justice Kennedy would certainly accept
assertions of federal jurisdiction over many wetlands that the plurality
opinion would place beyond the federal government's reach, the set of
parcels that would satisfy the plurality without satisfying Justice Kennedy
is almost certainly a null set. According to the plurality, "relatively
continuous flow is a necessary condition for qualification as a 'water,' not
an adequate condition."' In other words, were there to be a wetland that
is connected to a navigable water by a "relatively continuous flow" of
water that is so inconsequential as to fail to satisfy Justice Kennedy's
requirement of a "significant nexus," there is every reason to believe that
it would fail to satisfy the plurality as well. At the very least, the
plurality's characterization of its own test as a necessary-but-not-sufficient
basis for asserting jurisdiction should preclude any claim that Rapanos
provides an 8-1 holding for the proposition that any "relatively continuous
flow" will establish federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act."12
Gerke Excavating will not be the last word on the meaning of
Rapanos or the scope of "waters of the United States." At the time of this
article, additional cases are pending, and private landowners will continue
to challenge aggressive assertions of federal jurisdiction. Moreover, courts
may be asked to evaluate any regulations or guidance adopted by the
federal government re-interpreting the scope of "waters of the United
States" in light of Rapanos. Yet not all responses to Rapanos will be in the
courts.

109 Gerke II,

464 F.3d at 725.
no Id. at 725.
1" Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2223 n.7 (Scalia, J., plurality). See also id. at 2221 n.5 ("[W]e
have no occasion in this litigation to decide exactly when the drying-up of a stream bed is
continuous and frequent enough to disqualify the channel as a 'wate[r] of the United
States."').
112 There is the further problem with characterizing anything as a "holding" that is not
part of the judgment under Marks.
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IV. THE ROAD AHEAD
Not all responses to Rapanos will be in the courts. The federal
government is in the process of generating a guidance document
explaining how federal agencies should interpret the decision. It is
possible that a notice-and-comment rulemaking and revised regulations
will follow." 3 In the meantime, agencies will seek to apply the decision on
a case-by-case basis. State and local governments may respond as well,
insofar as limits on federal jurisdiction create a need, or simply an
opportunity, for greater environmental efforts at the state and local level.
One clear implication of the Court's decision in Rapanos is that the
current federal regulations used by the Army Corps of Engineers and
Environmental Protection Agency to define the scope of the CWA are no
longer valid. For instance, insofar as federal regulations purport to define
"waters of the United States" to include intrastate waters "the use,
degradation, or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce or
foreign commerce," 1 1 4 and wetlands adjacent to such waters,115 they
exceed the holdings of both SWANCC and Rapanos.
Courts owe substantial deference to the Army Corps and the EPA
in their assessment of the ecological connections between types of
wetlands and water systems and navigable waters. Yet those regulations
currently on the books do not establish such a connection, and provide no
assurance that those wetlands over which the Corps' asserts jurisdiction in
fact have a "significant nexus" to the waters of the United States. Until the
Corps and the EPA promulgate regulations that identify those wetland
characteristics that are sufficient to establish such a nexus, in at least the
majority of cases, the Corps will be forced to "establish a significant nexus
on a case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on
adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries.""' 6
While Rapanos imposes limits on federal CWA jurisdiction, it
nonetheless leaves federal regulators with substantial leeway in how to
113 Indeed,

some of the Justices clearly expect new regulations to issue. See Rapanos, 126
S. Ct at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I believe that today's opinions, taken together, call
for the Army Corps of Engineers to write new regulations, and speedily so.").
114 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2005).
"'
116Id. § 328.3(a)(7).
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2249.
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interpret "waters of the United States" in the future. Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion calls upon the Army Corps and EPA to identify those
ecological and other factors that could indicate that a given water or
wetland has a "significant nexus" with navigable waters. Just as existing
regulations presume that wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters
have a "significant nexus" to such waters, Kennedy expects regulatory
officials to identify other factors to serve as indicators of an ecological
connection sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion also offers federal regulators
significant room to define the scope of "waters of the United States,"
albeit not as much as would be provided by Justice Kennedy or the
dissenting justices. Despite Justice Scalia's focus on the text of the statute,
his opinion avoids claiming that the precise scope of CWA jurisdiction is
clear, and that no deference is due to the Corps of Engineers. To the
contrary, while portions of the opinion appear to be offering an
authoritative interpretation of the term "waters" in the CWA, that is not
what the opinion actually does.
In administrative law terms, Scalia's opinion rejects the Corps of
Engineers' interpretation at step two rather than step one of the familiar
Chevron analysis."' 7 Indeed, Scalia quotes the language of step two whether the agency has adopted a "permissible construction" of
ambiguous statutory text in rejecting the Corps' position - rather than
relying on the language of step one. His opinion explicitly notes that
"'waters of the United States' is in some respects ambiguous," and
acknowledges that there is some "ambiguity" as to where land ends and
water begins.' All that is clear, according to the plurality, is that "[t]he
Corps' expansive interpretation of 'the waters of the United States' is ...
not 'based on a permissible construction of the statute.""' 9 This reading of
the plurality is reinforced by Chief Justice Roberts' concurring opinion,
which suggests that the statute is sufficiently ambiguous for the Army
Corps of Engineers to "enjoy[] plenty of room to operate in developing
some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority."l 20 It also
117

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

118Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2226 (Scalia, J., plurality).

"9 Id. at 2225.
120Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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suggests that the federal government would retain substantial ability to go
back and define "waters of the United States" in fairly expansive terms,
even if it could not rely upon a fifth vote from Justice Kennedy for a broad
interpretation of the Act.'21
Just because the federal government retains substantial flexibility
in defining the scope of "waters of the United States," does not mean that
this flexibility should be used to adopt the most expansive definition. In
developing new implementing regulations, the federal government should
not repeat the mistake of seeking to evade the judgment of the Supreme
Court and assert the broadest possible interpretation of "waters of the
United States" allowable under Rapanos.122 Adopting a regulatory
interpretation that is potentially at odds with Rapanos and SWANCC is not
in the interest of the regulated community nor does it best serve the cause
of wetland conservation. Refusing to abide by the letter and spirit of the
Supreme Court's decision is a recipe for further litigation and uncertainty
as to the scope of federal regulations. It would also represent a missed
opportunity to harmonize federal regulations with current law and the
federal government's particular conservation interests.
Federal regulatory resources are necessarily limited. For this
reason, federal resources are best utilized if they are targeted at those areas
where there is an identifiable federal interest or the federal government is
in a particularly good position to advance conservation goals.123 For
example, there is an undeniable federal interest in regulating the filling or
dredging of wetlands where such activities would cause or contribute to
interstate pollution problems or compromise water quality in interstate
waterways. Where the effects of wetland modification are more localized,
121 It

is also worth noting that insofar as the plurality's interpretation of "waters of the
United States" was put forward in the absence of a permissible agency interpretation, the
Army Corps would retain the ability to adopt an authoritative interpretation of the
statutory language under National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n. See Nat'l Cable
& Telecomm. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
122 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his concurring opinion, had the Army Corps
completed a notice-and-comment rulemaking to develop new regulations responding to
the Supreme Court's SWANCC decision, it may have avoided its "defeat" in Rapanos.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
123 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005).
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the federal interest is less clear. Not coincidentally, in the latter case, the
basis for federal jurisdiction is also more attenuated.
Limiting federal regulatory authority would create room for the
expansion of state and local regulatory efforts. Over-expansive assertions
of federal regulatory authority may preclude, discourage, or otherwise
inhibit state and local governments from adopting environmental
protections where state efforts would be worthwhile.12 4 Contrary to
common perceptions, state wetland regulation preceded federal regulatory
efforts.1 25 Indeed, the first state wetland conservation statutes were
adopted more than a decade before the Army Corps and EPA began
regulating the dredging and filling of wetlands. Since then, many states
have stayed well ahead of the federal government, adopting more
innovative or protective wetland conservation programs. By developing
jurisdictional regulations that establish a "significant nexus," in part, by
focusing on those instances in which there is a particular federal interest,
the Army Corps and EPA can maximize wetland conservation by
complementing and supplementing, rather than supplanting, state efforts.
In the wake of the SWANCC decision, at least 19 states considered
or adopted additional protections for isolated waters. 126 Ohio, for example,
adopted an "emergency measure" to protect isolated wetlands in July
2001.127 Wisconsin, Indiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina are
among those states that took action in response to the SWANCC
decision.128 The fate of the site at issue in SWANCC is also instructive.
This point is explained in detail in Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd: The
Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
(forthcoming).
125 The history of state wetland regulation, beginning with Massachusetts' adoption of the
first wetland regulations in 1963, is summarized in Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands,
Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudenceand the
Limits ofFederal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 47-54 (1999).
126 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Curious Flightof the MigratoryBird Rule, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11,079, 11,085 (2001).
127 H.B. 231, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
128 See C. Victor Pyle III, Isolated Wetlands JurisprudencePost-SWANCC and Resulting
Federaland State Attempts to Fill the Void, 11 SOUTHEASTERN ENvTL L.J. 91, 101-106
(2002) (summarizing initial state-level responses); Jan Goldman-Carter, Isolated Wetland
Legislation: Running the Rapids at the State Capitol, NATL WETLANDS NEWSLETTER,
May-June 2005, at 27 (same). See also, Jon Kusler, The SWANCC Decision: State
124
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Once it became clear that the federal government did not have the
authority to prevent the construction of a balefill on the site, local
government agencies that had previously supported the project acted
quickly to stop the project and conserve the land at issue.' 29
Those states that did not enact protections for isolated wetlands
after SWANCC failed to act for one of several reasons. First, some states
already had statutory or regulatory protections for isolated wetlands in
place. Among the states that the Association of State Wetland Managers
reports have comprehensive wetland protection programs are:
Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia.' 30 Including those
states that acted in response to SWANCC, over 20 states now provide some
protection for the sort of isolated freshwater wetlands most affected by the
SWANCC decision.
Some states were likely discouraged from acting due to the
tremendous uncertainty about the extent to which state action was
necessary after SWANCC, including conflicting agency applications and
an interpretive split in the lower courts. This sort of uncertainty
discourages states from acting insofar as it is less clear what the benefits
of additional state action will be.131 Moreover, as noted above, a federal
regulatory presence can discourage states from acting on their own.
Numerous states filed amicus briefs in Rapanos arguing against the
imposition of any limitation on federal jurisdiction over wetlands,132 but
this does not mean states would not regulate if given the opportunity. State
governments have always preferred for the federal government to pay for
and provide services and programs that states are fully capable of
providing. Therefore, the amicus briefs illustrate nothing other than states
Regulation of Wetlands to Fill the Gap (Mar. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancc/aswm-int.pdf.
12 9 See Michael Higgins, Balefill Battle Winds Down: State Offer to
Buy Bartlett Site May
End 16-year Feud, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2001, at 1; Sue Ter Maat, With Balefill Out of
Game, Developers Have Whole New PlayingField, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 12, 2003,
at 1.
130 See Kusler, supra note 128, at
14.
131 See Adler, supra
note
124.
132 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct.2208, 2246 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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would like for the federal government to devote its resources to protect
ecological values that are important in these states. That state governments
would prefer federal regulation - thereby avoiding having to dedicate their
own resources to such programs (as well as avoiding having to take
responsibility and be accountable for the consequences of any public
disapproval with the implementation of the program) - says nothing about
the extent to which states are able and willing to adopt programs of their
own. 133
Apart from any actions taken by states to fill gaps in federal
regulation left by Rapanos, there is concern about the implication of the
opinion on water pollution control efforts, such as the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES").134 Yet the reduction of
jurisdiction to regulate wetlands does not necessarily impose equivalent
limits on the NPDES program. As the Scalia plurality opinion noted, the
Clean Water Act prohibits any unpermitted discharge of a pollutant into
"waters of the United States." The discharge need not be direct. Further,
Justice Scalia wrote, "from the time of the CWA's enactment, lower courts
have held that the discharge into intermittent channels of any pollutant that
naturally washes downstream likely violates § 1311(a), even if the
pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit 'directly into'
35
covered waters, but pass 'through conveyances' in between."' In other
words, actions that cause the pollution of waters and wetlands that are
beyond the scope of the Clean Water Act could nonetheless be subject to
the act if they result in such discharges into waters of the United States. In
this way, narrowing the Act's jurisdiction does not have as great an impact
on the NPDES program as it does upon Section 404.
It is also important not to lose sight of the fact that federal
regulation under the CWA is not the only means for advancing wetland
conservation and water pollution control. Indeed, the experience of federal
See also id. at 2224 n.8 (Scalia, J., plurality) ("[I]t makes no difference to the statute's
stated purpose of preserving States' 'rights and responsibilities' . . . that some States with
to unburden themselves of them. Legislative and executive officers of the States may be
content to leave 'responsibility[y]' with the Corps because it is attractive to shift to
another entity controversial decisions disputed between politically powerful, rival
interests.").
114 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
3
s Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2227 (Scalia, J., plurality) (emphasis omitted).
133
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conservation programs that rely upon incentives and cooperation with
private landowners compares quite favorably with the conflicts and
inconsistencies of federal wetland regulations. 136 Federal support for the
protection of waterfowl habitat dates back many decades to the sale of
"duck stamps" to bird hunters. This program created a dedicated source of
revenue for conservation of an estimated 4.5 million acres of waterfowl
habitat.137 Other programs under which the federal government enters into
private agreements with landowners to restore wetlands on their property,
while subsidizing the cost of restoration and the purchase of a permanent
or multi-year easement to ensure that the wetland is protected, are
particularly cost-effective when compared to mandated mitigation under
the CWA.' 3 8 Such programs are also not confined by the jurisdictional
limits of the CWA, nor do they generate the litigation and conflict of
federal controls on private land-use decisions.
Insofar as some types of wetlands, such as prairie potholes, may be
particularly likely to lie beyond the scope of federal regulation, incentive
programs remain a viable conservation option. Indeed, enlisting private
landowners and conservation organizations through incentive programs
has conserved hundreds of thousands of acres of wetlands and was the
driving force behind the attainment of "no net loss" of wetlands during the
1990s.' 3 9 There is no reason why this cannot continue, despite the
limitations on federal regulatory jurisdiction. It would be a tragedy to
place an inordinate focus on maximizing regulatory jurisdiction at the
expense of providing sufficient support for alternative means of
encouraging wetland conservation.
These programs are a very cost-effective and efficient means of
conserving and restoring wetlands and other ecologically valuable lands.
One reason these programs are so effective is that they enlist private
landowners as partners in conservation, and encourage environmental
stewardship on private land. By contrast, regulatory proscriptions of
private land use engender hostility and resentment, and often discourage
See Adler, supra note 125, at 54-66.
1 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 34 n.190
(1997).
38 These programs are summarized in Adler, supra note 125, at 56-59.
' Adler, supra note 125, at 56-57.
136
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private landowners from cooperating in conservation efforts.140 Another
reason these programs are particularly effective is because they are
targeted upon the maintenance and protection of particular ecosystem
services, such as the provision of waterfowl habitat. The Section 404
program, on the other hand, is not targeted on the protection of particular
ecosystem services. To the contrary, many regulatory decisions under
section 404 are made without any meaningful consideration of the

ecological impacts.141
The federal government is not the only entity engaged in wetland
conservation, let alone environmental protection more broadly. State and
local governments have been active in wetlands protection for longer than
the Army Corps and the EPA. Indeed, some states began wetland
conservation before the EPA even existed.
CONCLUSION

By some accounts, Rapanos v. United States threatened to
eviscerate federal wetland protection efforts. An article in Scientific
American, "The End of the Everglades?," proclaimed that the case
"jeopardize[d] 90 percent of U.S. wetland[s]." 42 As a consequence, the
Rapanos decision would "probably eclipse [the] importance" of current
controversies such as domestic surveillance and the detention of enemy

combatants.143
This presentation of the stakes in Rapanos, like those of many
activist groups on either side of the case, was exceedingly hyperbolic.
140 See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case Study in
Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997); Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael,
PreemptiveHabitat Destruction Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 46 J.L. & EcON. 27
(2003); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing
PerceptionsofProperty Rights and EnvironmentalProtection, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
987, 1006-09 (2005).
141 See Michael J. Mortimer, IrregularRegulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act: Is the Congress or the Army Corps ofEngineers to Blame?, 13 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG.
445 (1998).
142 Sara Beardsley, The End of the Everglades?, SCI. AM., June 2006, available at
http://www.sciam.com (follow "In Focus" hyperlink, then follow "Browse: 2006"
hyperlink).
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John Rapanos certainly put a very ambitious argument before the Court,
arguing that federal jurisdiction extended no farther than truly navigable
waters and their adjacent wetlands.'" Had the Court accepted this
argument, it is conceivable that the vast majority of wetlands and other
waters in the United States would no longer have been subject to the
CWA. But this was never a plausible outcome in the case - and, in the
end, not a single justice endorsed this theory.
Alarmist accounts are further misleading insofar as they equate the
reduction of federal regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA with a
reduction in environmental protection. Yet CWA regulation is not the only
means employed by the federal government to conserve wetlands and
other environmental resources, and the federal government is not the only
source of environmental protection.
Whether Rapanos results in an erosion of environmental protection
will be a function of how various institutions and entities respond. On the
one hand, the decision limits the federal government's statutory (if not
constitutional) authority to regulate land-use and potentially polluting
activities under the CWA. On the other, it may spur state and local
governments to enhance their conservation efforts and induce
policymakers at all levels of government to pursue more non-regulatory
conservation strategies. If the latter course is adopted, Rapanos may well
have a salutary effect on the protection of private rights to control land and
environmental protection alike.

'"Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., plurality).
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